Joe Nocera is a bright guy. Over the course of a lengthy career, the former Fortune executive editor has won numerous awards for excellence in business journalism and recently co-authored a penetrating analysis of the financial crisis (All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis). He now hangs his hat at the New York Times, covering a wide range of business-related topics.

Mr. Nocera also stands out for his willingness to discuss the sorry state of his personal finances, a startling admission for a world-class financial journalist. With his sixtieth birthday approaching, he recently revealed to readers that his 401(k) is “in tatters.” Some of the culprits are familiar: A concentrated strategy during the technology boom put a big dent in his portfolio, and a divorce several years later inflicted similar damage. A third source of difficulty is harder to fathom—the decision to raid his 401(k) to fund a home remodeling project.

Mr. Nocera acknowledges that good financial advisors provide sound advice regarding discipline and diversification, but he doesn’t appear to have consulted one.

Mr. Nocera found a sympathetic ear in Teresa Ghilarducci, a behavioral economist at The New School. She was not the least bit surprised by his experience—most humans, in her view, have neither the skill nor the emotional stability to be successful investors. She finds the entire concept of a participant-driven 401(k) a “failed experiment.”

Prompted by this tale of woe, I dug out twenty-three years’ worth of 401(k) statements and surveyed the results for the first time. As a thirty-nine-year-old research director at LPL Financial, I was late to the starting line for the retirement race. I filled out the enrollment forms and devoted about three minutes to the task of selecting my retirement plan vehicles. When I opened my first 401(k) statement in March 1990, it showed a whopping balance of $195.26 from investments in three Putnam Equity mutual funds—two U.S. and one global.

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After joining Dimensional in early 1995, I liquidated the Putnam funds and placed the rollover balance in Dimensional’s 401(k). I don’t recall what my thinking was at the time, but with seven equity funds in my account rather than three, it seems plausible that I devoted more than three minutes to the portfolio construction decision. Maybe six.

Over the last twenty-three years I have occasionally been tempted to fiddle with the allocation scheme, usually after some big move in the markets up or down.
But I am skeptical of my capacity for self-discipline. What if a tactical decision to underweight small stocks or overweight emerging markets turned out to be right? Would I be tempted to make an even bigger bet the next time? I could find myself on a slippery slope leading to a one-fund portfolio. My preferred strategy, as a result, is to do nothing. Some might argue I have taken this slothful approach to an extreme, having never added a new fund to the lineup (no Emerging Markets Value?!), never tweaked the portfolio weights, and never rebalanced. Call it the Rip Van Winkle strategy—when you get the urge to do something, take a nap.

From a humble beginning, my account has grown to a generous sum over the past twenty-three years, although it hasn’t always been smooth sailing. Using quarterly data, the overall value fell 12.8% during the technology stock meltdown (March 31, 2000–September 30, 2002) and suffered a thumping loss of 46.8% during the financial crisis (September 30, 2007–March 31, 2009), despite a stream of fresh contributions. But the recovery was dramatic as well—up 77.5% for the twelve months ending March 2010 and up another 23.5% for the subsequent year. The current balance exceeds the 2007 high water mark by a comfortable margin. This is not an exercise in self-congratulation, just an example of what anyone could have done by harnessing the forces of competitive markets.

Perhaps the 401(k), in its current form, is indeed a “failed experiment” for a substantial fraction of the workforce. Another interpretation is that the 401(k) was never intended as a centerpiece for retirement funding, and the enrollment process cries out for improvement. Participant outcomes might be greatly enhanced if choices were presented in a way that acknowledges persistent behavioral traits leading to poor decisions.

And when it comes to charting one’s financial future, it appears even journalists skillful enough to unravel complicated financial puzzles can benefit from an objective second opinion.

References

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
The experience of Mr. Wellington may not be representative of the experience of other investors. This information is no guarantee of the future performance or success of other investors.

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The Perils of Market Timing
Investors who flee the stock market for the safety of cash may experience temporary relief from market volatility. But after leaving stocks, their anxiety may shift to concern over missing a stock market rebound. Let’s look at the first quarter of 2009 as an example.

The first graph shows returns for the entire first quarter of 2009. The second and third graphs show returns over two distinct periods during the quarter—a negative return period from January 1 to March 9, and a subsequent positive return period from March 10 to quarter end.

The shaded areas in the bars of the third graph indicate the return excluding March 10, which marked the first day of the rebound. Although returns for the quarter were negative, the rebound substantially reduced the magnitude of losses.

This is the nature of stock investing. Gains typically come in powerful upsurges against a backdrop of discouraging financial and economic news. As the March 2009 rally demonstrated, a surprise rebound may frustrate investors who are waiting for a clear signal to return to the market.

Of course, a brief period like this may not signal the start of a new bull market. But recent history does serve as a reminder of how suddenly a major turnaround can begin.